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Introduction
The United States has signed fifteen major arms control agreements with the 
Soviet Union 1 Each one required years of negotiations resulting m a set of 
restrictions that both parties agreed were equitable
The term "equitable" implies the existence of some equation where the 
left-hand side represents the aggregate US nuclear capabilities and the right- 
hand side represents the aggregate Soviet nuclear capabilities But what are 
the standard units of this equation7 How does one measure US nuclear 
capabilities7 Is there a proverbial yardstick that can be used7 And can the 
same "yardstick" be used to measure Soviet nuclear capabilities7
These questions can be addressed by using quantitative analysis Since 
nuclear arms control is already a quantitative process, mathematical 
modeling is a valid approach to assess nuclear capabilities and to negotiate 
mutual, equitable reductions
In mathematical terms, arms control can be considered a threefold 
process
1 Denve an equation (or inequality) relating US and Soviet nuclear forces at 
the present time (to)
2 Denve an equation relating US and Soviet nuclear forces at some future time 
(t0 + At) where the aggregate values of each force are less than the 
respective values at to
3 Reduce weapons to the levels expressed in the latter equation
Although the arms control process can be expressed m quantitative 
terms, the derivations are not strictly governed by mathematical or physical 
laws Politicians, bureaucrats, and strategists define the units of measure and 
the conversion factors (e g 1 MX = 15 SS-18s) Nonetheless, there are several 
mathematical rules that do apply m the derivation of these equations and 
these rules cannot be ignored Besides the basic rules of addition and 
multiplication, statistics and calculus must be taken into consideration
Unfortunately, these areas of mathematics have not been taken into 
consideration in past agreements This is evident when one looks at the 
history of the arms race and arms control dynamics
The arms race is primarily a nonlinear phenomenon Numerous 
relations such as kill probabilities versus expended warheads cannot be 
expressed accurately in linear terms 2 One would expect arms control 
agreements to account for these nonlinear weapons characteristics within the 
constraints This has not been the case
2The SALT agreements are a notable example Dr Jeffrey Grotte 
modeled the constraints specified m the SALT agreements 3 He found linear 
functions to be the most accurate models of the provisions
Grotte s results empirically validate a hypothesis that has been 
presented by several students of mathematical modeling policymakers 
perceive the world in linear terms They think that if an opponent increases 
his military capacity by any measurable quantity, then his effectiveness as a 
military power increases linearly If he doubles it, his effectiveness increases 
by a factor of two Nonlinear phenomena are neglected
To fit their mode of thinking, policymakers can shape the world in 
linear terms However, this requires the identification of nonlinear 
phenomenon such as payload capacity vs EMT and the implementation of 
policies such as arms control agreements that eliminate the nonlinearity by 
making the factors constant
The SALT agreements did not to do this As a result, opponents of the 
agreements showed asymmetries in various nonlinear parameters and 
argued against ratification of the agreements 4 These critics argued 
qualitatively that the linear functions representing the forces at time t0 + At 
were not valid approximations of the strategic situation
Nontechnical papers on the US-Soviet nuclear balance implicitly 
present the nonlinear characteristics of the arms race 5 Mathematical 
modeling can express these characteristics explicitly If presented in graphical 
form, policymakers can visualize these nonlineanties and then develop arms 
control policies that take these characteristics into account
Mathematical modeling opens a new dimension to the policymaker I 
will show the utility of mathematical modeling as a policymakers tool by 
looking at a particular example—a hypothetical two-nation arms race 
developed by Dr Thomas Saaty Although this model, m its present form, 
cannot be directly applied to the US-Soviet missile race, its fundamental 
structure can be adapted to model real missile dynamics
Literature Review
Thomas Saaty presented a simple model of two hypothetical countries 
possessing fixed-based ICBMs with nuclear warheads 6 After considering the 
significance of various technical factors, he developed stability equations for 
each side and showed the strategic impact of adding multiple warheads to one 
missile
3In addition, these equations could be used by hypothetical policymakers 
to determine the optimal configuration of nuclear forces that are capable of 
performing the specified missions 7 These equations could also be used to 
develop arms control proposals
Saaty s model is only one of several different arms race models To put 
Saaty s model in perspective, I will critically evaluate other models and 
examine the utility of these models as tools of diplomacy
Richardson was the first to develop a mathematical arms race model 
He modeled a two-nation arms race and used expenditures as the standard of 
measure Richardson s model (1960) is based on three assumptions 8
1 Each country increases its arms expenditures at a rate that is proportional to the 
other countries expenditures
2 Because of economic constraints each country decreases its arms expenditures at a rate 
that is proportional to its own expenditures
3 Each country increases its arms expenditures at a constant rate which reflects the 
intensity of the political conflict
In mathematical form, Richardson s model can be expressed as
dx , .— = a y -b x  + c ( 1 )
dt
^L = e x - fy  + g (2)
where
X -  country X s arms expenditures 
y -  country Y s arms expenditures 
a b c e f g -  constant coefficients
Richardson showed how all factors and underlying assumptions could 
be represented explicitly and how mathematics could be used to show the 
dynamic impact of each factor m a particular situation
Although Richardson created the foundation for further quantitative 
work, his model lacks the structure for realistic application The model has 
three primary deficiencies First, because Richardson uses aggregate military 
expenditures as his standard of measure, his model can only assess arms race 
dynamics from a macroscopic perspective The problem with such an 
approach is that there are typically a myriad of influencing factors that need to 
be declared as variables and included in the dynamic equations 9 Three basic 
assumptions are not sufficient It is extremely difficult to account for all of 
these factors and determine each one s influence on the overall dynamics A
4better approach is to develop models on a microscopic level that can be used 
individually or linked to other models By taking this approach, the relevant 
factors can be distributed in a network of "micro-models" which can model 
either a particular situation or the overall phenomenon
The second shortfall of the Richardson model is its incompatibility 
with the nuclear world In the prenuclear age, nations faced the conflict 
between the desire to have an infinite amount of firepower and the reality of 
limited resources At that time, uncontrolled spending was a logical indicator 
of the state of peace because the spending parameter reflected the intensity of 
the political-economic conflict In the Richardson model, as the political- 
economic conflict intensified, leaders grew increasingly willing to take 
desperate action—even to go to war
Richardson argued that the stability of the arms race directly 
determined the robustness of peace between the two rival nations 10 If the 
arms race was unstable (1 e uncontrolled spending), war would logically 
follow If the arms race was stable (1 e controlled spending), peace was the 
natural result
Because of the introduction of nuclear weapons, Richardson s 
assessment is obsolete The introduction of super weapons have radically 
changed traditional military strategy There now exists a complicated 
interrelationship between conventional and nuclear forces Since nuclear 
weapons have a significantly higher firepower-to-cost ratio than 
conventional weapons, nations can afford to build an arsenal that is capable 
of destroying each one of its enemies Consequently, nations that rely on 
nuclear weaponry do not have to worry about uncontrolled spending because 
they can attain their ideal level of destructive power with relative financial 
ease Thus, uncontrolled spending in nuclear weaponry is not an appropriate 
criterion for defining the nuclear threshold11
In addition to its obsolescence, Richardson s model fails to consider 
psychological differences between the two nations concerning the state of the 
arms race Richardson implicitly assumes the two nations have identical 
psychological processes As a result, he assumes both nations would derive 
equations (1 ) and (2) with the same coefficient values
This is not a realistic assumption Nobody would credibly state the 
collective egos of the United States and Soviet Union are identical thereby 
eliminating psychological dynamics as a factor Because of different social and 
economic systems and because of conflicting ideological and political systems, 
each nation often makes very different conclusions on the same facts because 
of various psychological factors 12 In Richardson s terminology, the United 
States would empirically derive a coefficient set of {a,b,c,e,f,g} and the Soviet 
Union would empirically derive a coefficient set of {a ,b ,c ,e ,f ,g )
5Consequently, there is no unique numerical solution to an arms race 
modeling problem For a two-nation model, there are always at least two 
solutions Both are needed to identify not only the perceptual differences, but 
also conceptual basis behind these differences
In addition to Richardson s model, several contemporary nuclear arms 
race models have been developed The Intriligator-Bnto model is a well- 
known example of a two-nation nuclear arms race13 Compared to 
Richardson, Michael Intriligator and Dagobert Brito took a very different 
approach Instead of using aggregate military expenditures as the standard of 
measure, Intriligator and Brito used nuclear missiles and casualties Instead 
of addressing the factors that drove the arms race, Intriligator and Brito 
addressed the military effectiveness of each nation s capabilities Instead of 
determining the stability of the arms race, Intriligator and Brito defined the 
thresholds between war initiation and deterrence
The underlying assumption of the I-B model is deterrence theory If 
each side has the military capacity to deter the other from attacking by 
threatemng massive nuclear retaliation, Intriligator and Brito define this 
situation as stable and peaceful On the other hand, if each side does not have 
sufficient retaliatory forces to deter the opponent, Intriligator and Brito define 
this situation as unstable and capricious
The I-B model provides a useful theoretical framework to examine 
issues relating arms races to war initiation This framework has significant 
applications for the policymaker The policymaker could use the I-B 
framework to determine the impact of an arms control agreement or new 
missile on the deterrence system Similarly, the policymaker could use the I- 
B model to determine what types of weapons systems or arms control 
agreements would create more stable strategic situations
There is one significant addition to this model that needs to be made if 
the model is to represent the US-Soviet nuclear arms race In the missile war 
portion of the model, Intriligator and Brito did not include SLBMs, cruise 
missiles, and bombers Nor did they account for different ICBM types14 To 
apply their model to the US-Soviet arms race, Intriligator and Brito would 
have to link their model with a set of models that dealt with other nuclear 
weapons systems
Even as a submodel of strategic weapons systems, the I-B model cannot 
be directly applied as a policymaker s tool because it does not permit political 
stability inputs
6Figure 1 Intnligator-Bnto Model
Figure 1 shows the general structure of the I-B model Intriligator and 
Brito developed their model to determine the relationship between arms 
races and war initiation As part of the inputs, they introduced rigidly defined 
deterrence criteria that reflected (m their opinion) the security concerns of US
7and Soviet leaders15 They assumed these criteria were not only realistic but 
also constant with respect to time
Under the I-B model, the policymaker is not given the flexibility to 
alter the deterrence criteria since it is already built into the model Several 
academicians immediately criticized this part of the I-B model However, 
they didn t criticize the failure to account for the dynamic variation of the 
deterrence criteria which is representative of US and Soviet political history 
They criticized the logical basis of the I-B criteria
Thomas Mayer argued that the I-B model was unrealistic because it did 
not include any criteria for offensive success He argued that stability is 
attained not only by threatening high costs through retribution, but also by 
offering very little strategic gam 16
Mayer s argument can be expressed mathematically Consider the 
function G that represents the ratio of benefits received and the costs incurred 
from a nuclear first strike
G = |  (3)
where
B -  Strategic benefits gained from attack 
C -  Strategic costs incurred from attack
From the potential attacker s perspective, the function G must be 
greater than some threshold value for it to be worthwhile to attack
where
G >T (4)
T -  Threshold attack value
Intriligator and Brito argued that G can be kept below this threshold by 
increasing the destructive potential of one s retaliatory forces This translates 
to increasing C
Mayer argued that this nondimensional criterion is inadequate He 
argued strategic planners do not contemplate attack unless there is a 
reasonable chance of success defined by the magnitude of the benefits
where
B > Tb  (5)
Tg -  Threshold Attack Value
This criterion must be combined with relation (4) Otherwise, the 
model implies "a country with no nuclear arms at all may contemplate 
attacking a country possessing these weapons " 17 Figure 2 graphically shows 
the I-B model and illustrates Mayer s point
8Ma  -  Number of Missiles Possessed by Country A 
Mb  -  Number of Missiles Possessed by Country B
Figure 2 I-B Stability Plot19
Using similar reasoning, Bernard Springer showed how the I-B 
deterrence criteria fails to account for possible asymmetrical targeting 
strategies between the "first striker" and "second striker " 18 Consequently, the 
I-B model predicts one nation may attack another even if the outcome is the 
destruction of all of its cities and the preservation of all cities of the opponent
The consequences of the flaws in the I-B model are serious Using their 
model as a theoretical proof, Intriligator and Brito argued arms races could 
lead to war or to peace and disarming races could lead to peace or to war 
Because of flaws in the proof, these assertions remain unproven
The debate over the I-B model further shows the importance of 
separating the political stability criteria from the construction of the model 
Because Intriligator and Brito did not do this, they discredited the utility of 
their model because of mistakes in their political criteria 20 Without a robust 
model, policy-significant conclusions have little or no logical basis
Critics of the I-B approach and similar models argue that war 
simulations digress from the mam objective " to understand actual dyadic 
armaments processes " 21 They argue arms races and stability issues can only 
be understood by modeling the dynamics of the arms race itself
9Students of this school argue that one dominant factor influences the 
arms race—the opponent s military capabilities All other factors are higher- 
order approximations and for all intensive purposes can be neglected
If Country A uses Country B s military capabilities as the basis for 
modifying its own arsenal, then A s policy decision can be considered a 
response to a specific stimuli (Country B s force) Similarly, if Country B 
makes decisions in a symmetric manner, its policy decision can be considered 
a response to Country A s response In this model, the arms race is reduced to 
a series of actions and reactions that begins at a defined time, T0 In physical 
terms, this model can be considered the application of Newton s Third Law to 
nuclear arms races
At first glance, this model appears to be representative of the US- 
Soviet arms race On the US side, policymakers have justified a variety of 
military programs as a proportionate response to close certain gaps that 
favored the Soviet Union 22 On the Soviet side, leaders have taken drastic 
measures to close gaps that favored the United States 23
The principal problem with an action-reaction, multi-dimensional 
model is the difficulty of separating the actions from the reactions Neither 
superpower ever claims it was the first to add another rung to the arms race 
ladder Both claim to be constantly reacting and thus somehow defying the 
fundamental basis of this model—Newton s Third Law
The academician constructing the model must filter out the "true" 
actions from the infinite pool of reactions However, this is often impossible 
because of lack of perfect and total information To make accurate 
assessments, the academician must not only decide what are the prevailing 
views in decision-making and technological circles, but also must identify the 
psychological motivations behind these views For example, is the Strategic 
Defense Initiative actually a response to Soviet efforts in ballistic missile 
defense as claimed by SDI proponents such as Edward Teller724 Or is the SDI 
an offensive policy designed as a "technological end run around the 
Soviets ' 25 Debates on the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe, the 
B-l bomber, and the Trident n missile have raised similar questions on the 
origins of government policy
Furthermore, even if it is possible to discriminate between the actions 
and the reactions, the distinction is often irrelevant because of the 
psychological history of the events If Decision-maker A perceived his policy 
as a response to Country B s policy when it actually was an initiative, 
developing a historical model that labels A's policy as an action inadequately 
represents the situation An action-reaction model of the bomber and missile 
gap would collapse just as easily as the gaps did 26
10
Like all designs and models, each of the enumerated models has its 
strengths and weaknesses Many of the strengths are compatible with Saaty s 
basic model structure In the next section, I shall define the model 
specifications and incorporate the strengths of previous models m order to 
better illustrate the utility of Saaty s model structure to modeling US-Soviet 
ICBM dynamics
ICBM Dynamics and Saaty s Model
Saaty developed his model to show quantitatively and graphically one specific 
phenomenon—the strategic impact of MIRVing intercontinental ballistic 
missiles Although he limited his model to this particular application, its 
fundamental structure can be used to model an array of ICBM dynamics Its 
simplicity and applicability to one of the three legs of the triad makes it a 
suitable means of examining various ICBM issues
As rocket technology developed in the 1950s, both the United States 
and the Soviet Union began the transition from intercontinental bomber to 
strategic missile-dominant forces The United States initiated the ICBM era 
with the deployment of the Atlas ICBM in 1959 The Soviet Union joined the 
ICBM club in 1960 with the deployment of a handful of SS-6 ICBMs 27 Over 
the next twenty years, the superpowers firmly established ICBMs as a critical 
component of their nuclear arsenal which possessed unique military 
capabilities—reliable command and control, short delivery time, high state of 
readiness, and relatively high accuracy
The United States has approximately 1000 operational ICBMs carrying 
2450 warheads The Soviet Union has approximately 1400 operational ICBMs 
carrying 6000 warheads 28 The Soviet Umon has placed more of their nuclear 
eggs in the ICBM basket than the United States Approximately 75% of Soviet 
strategic warheads are deployed on ICBMs while only 18% of US strategic 
warheads are deployed on ICBMs 29
Saaty s model cannot take other types of weapons systems into 
consideration Other models have to be developed to account for SLBMs, 
SLCMs, ALCMs, strategic bombers, air defenses, and possibly strategic 
defenses Nonetheless, even though Saaty's model is not comprehensive, it 
is useful for microstrategic analysis
ICBM dynamics can be isolated from the overall nuclear picture for two 
reasons First, for the forseeable future, ICBMs will be most vulnerable to 
attack from the adversary s ICBMs The short flight time and advertised 
pinpoint accuracy make ICBMs suitable weapons to attack ICBM silos and 
control centers 30 Because strategic defenses will not be deployed for the
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forseeable future, the threat to ICBMs will not diminish for at least the next 
decade
Second, both sides have shown that they will not tolerate ICBM 
vulnerability even if the other two legs of the triad remain relatively 
invulnerable to attack The United States has demonstrated its resolve to 
close the "window of vulnerability" through the deployment of the MX and 
mobile Midgetman missile The Soviet Union has responded to the ICBM 
threat by deploying the rail-mobile SS-24 and road-mobile SS-25 31 Based on 
these policies, it is clear each side does not evaluate its nuclear security strictly 
on the aggregate second-strike capability The second-strike capability of each 
leg of the triad is considered of equal importance since each leg has its own 
unique capabilities Thus, a microstrategic security analysis of each leg of the 
triad will produce the same results as one comprehensive analysis Within 
this context, Saaty s model is appropriate for isolating the ICBM dynamics 
from the aggregate nuclear capabilities
The foundation of any model is a set of postulates The origins of these 
postulates can be traced back to the first model type—Richardson s model To 
apply to Saaty s model, Richardson s postulates can be modified as the 
following
1 Out of fear of vulnerability a country increases its ICBM arsenal because of 
the existence of an opponent s arsenal
2 Because of a countiy s need for security through deterrence there is a dnve 
to increase one s ICBM arsenal
3 Because of economic and political constraints a country tries to reduce its 
ICBM arsenal
Richardson expressed his three postulates explicitly in his model For 
Saaty s model, only the first of the modified postulates is expressed explicitly 
The second is expressed implicitly and the third provides a reason for 
developing a model for decision-making purposes
In addition to these three postulates, a fourth postulate has to account 
for the strategic revolution brought on by the invention of nuclear weapons
4 Because nuclear weapons and delivery systems have radically changed the 
nature of war by providing effectively infinite firepower and the 
capability to destroy the adversary s society without having to destroy 
the adversary s military neither country will have an effective defense 
for the forseeable future Therefore each country must base its security on 
deterrence through retaliation
12
Saaty defines several variables for each country representing various 
military capabilities and nuclear policies 32
M -The number of missiles possessed by Country A 
N -The number of missiles possessed by Country B 
t -the number of warheads per N or M missile
u -the probability Country A s warhead destroys Country B s missile using 
one warhead with a weight equal to the missile s payload capacity 
V -the probability Country B s warhead destroys Country A s missile using 
one warhead with a weight equal to the missile s payload capacity 
a  -the minimum number of missiles needed by Country A for a second strike 
ß -the minimum number of missiles needed by Country B for a second strike
Note that Saaty initially assumes each side has the same number of 
warheads on each missile This assumption was made for the sake of 
mathematical simplicity For his purposes, the simplification did not alter 
the model s output For other ICBM dynamics, two t values may be required
ti-the number of warheads per M missile 
t2~the number of warheads per N missile
Saaty s model can easily be modified with these two variables
The values for all the variables, except a and ß, can be obtained 
empirically or derived from empirical data a and ß represent values that 
cannot be derived mathematically or physically These two values have to be 
obtained through political means Saaty assumed a and ß represent the 
minimum number of warheads needed to destroy the opponent s cities (1 e 
Mutual Assured Destruction) Even though Saaty made this assumption, a 
and ß can be derived from any type of nuclear strategy or political philosophy 
I shall only specify what a and ß represent—not what value a and ß should 
take
Smce Saaty was primarily interested in hardened targets, he based his 
kill probability equations on the blast effects of a nuclear detonation The 
intensity of blast damage is a function of the radius of the spherically-shaped 
shock wave The volume of the sphere at maximum expansion is directly 
proportional to the yield Thus,
r = y1/3 (6)
where
r -  radius 
y -  warhead yield
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If the reference warhead defined in u and v is divided into t warheads 
of equal yield, the ratio of the blast effect of one of the t warheads to the 
reference warhead would be the following
Equation (7) can be combined with the reference values, u and v, to 
obtain new kill probability expressions that are a function of the number of 
MIRVs on each missile
Equations (8) and (9) show explicitly the relationship between the kill 
probability and number of MIRVs These equations also express implicitly 
other factors such as missile reliability, warhead accuracy, and warhead yield 
All of the implicit factors are represented in u and v 33
MIRVs have both economic and strategic implications From an 
economic perspective MIRVs are efficient MIRVs reduce the number of 
missiles needed to deliver x number of warheads and thus reduce 
development costs From a strategic perspective, MIRVs enable a country to 
attack all of the opponents missile silos while maintaining a fraction of the 
offensive force in reserve for mtrawar deterrence or a third strike 34
Allocating more than one warhead per target through cross-targeting 
further increases the kill probability If Country A or B wishes to maintain a 
strategic reserve after inflicting a first strike and chooses to maintain that 
reserve m the other two legs of the tnad, the country can use all of its ICBMs 
against the opponents silos For example, Country s A and B have the 
following aggregate number of ICBM warheads
This means Country A could allocate Q/N warheads per target and 
Country B could allocate R/M warheads per target
(7)
where
B -  rabo of blast effects
(8)
(9)
where
k^ -  the probability Country A s warhead destroys Country B s missile 
kß -  the probability Country B s warhead destroys Country A s missile
Q = tM 
R = tN
( 10)
(ID
where
Q -  total number of warheads possessed by Country A 
R -  total number of warheads possessed by Country B
14
With the enumerated data, the empirical variables can be related to the 
political variables Since the kill probabilities have been defined and since the 
number of warheads allocated per target has been defined, the survival 
probability can be defined
z A= ( l - k B) R/M 0 2 )
z „ = ( l - k A)Q/N (13)
Given equations (12) and (13), decision-makers will be particularly 
concerned with how these expressions relate to their political criterion (a or b) 
and their current arsenal (M or N and t) They will want to be certain that the 
minimum number of missiles needed for a second strike will, at the very 
least, equal the number of missiles that will survive a counterforce attack In 
mathematical terms,
Mza  > a  (14)
Nzß > ß (15)
If conditions (14) and (15) are satisfied, each side feels secure As a 
result, the two-nation deterrence system becomes stable From an economic 
standpoint, decision-makers should strive to make relations (14) and (15) 
equalities As equations, each side would achieve nuclear security at 
minimum cost
Relations (14) and (15) can be expressed graphically Two or three- 
dimensional plots could be generated To understand the mathematical 
relationships for plotting, relations (14) and (15) should be rewritten
M = a
N =
( l - k B)
____ ß_
( l - k A)
tN/M
tM/N
(16)
(17)
These equations represent the optimal force structure for each country 
In this form, it is clear that several different types of two or three-dimensional 
plots can be made If there are N variables, P types of two-dimensional plots 
can be made
N
P = £ ( i - 1 )  (18)
1=1
where
P -  number of possible two-dimensional plots 
N -  number of variables
15
Equations (16) and (17) contain seven variables so 21 different plots can 
be generated If ti and t2 are incorporated into the model, 28 different plots can 
be made
Similarly, P3 types of three-dimensional plots can be made
N-2
”3 = S
1=1
N-i
5 > »
i n
(19)
where
P3 -  number of possible three-dimensional plots
Equation (19) reveals that 35 plots could be generated from equations 
(16) and (17) If ti and t2are added to the model, 56 plots could be made
For this analysis, only the M, N, and t variables will be considered since 
these variables can be controlled through verifiable arms control measures 
The following types of plots will be examined M vs N, M vs t, and N vs t 
A three-dimensional plot will also be examined The utility of each plot 
depends on the type of phenomena to be modeled For Saaty s example, an M 
vs N plot was the best representation of the region of stability 35
Note that m order to plot equations (16) and (17), one cannot simply 
substitute values for the independent variable and obtain values for the 
dependent variable The M and N variables cannot be separated As a result, 
an iterative algorithm is needed to obtain a solution set
This presents a mathematical problem Does a solution set exist and is 
it unique7 Based on the derivation, it is implied that there is a unique 
solution set However, there is no mathematical substance to support this 
hypothesis
A principle factor in the utility of Saaty s model is the existence and 
uniqueness of its solution set Thus, a mathematical analysis of Saaty's model 
is needed before examining its applicability to simulating ICBM dynamics
16
Mathematical Analysis of Saaty s Equations
Suppose an M or N vs t plot is needed to illustrate a particular ICBM 
effect such as the impact of deMIRVmg or vertical missile proliferation For 
this application, either M and N or t could be the independent variable 
Suppose that t is the dependent variable Rewriting equation (16) m a form 
that reduces the number of constants,36
M -------17 m <20>
( X ) m
where
N
A.= ( l - k , T
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of equation (20),
lnM  = ln a - ln (X ) t/M
ln(X)t/M=ln a - ln M
— ln A ,= ln a-ln M  
M
Solving for t,
t _ M(ln a - ln M ) 
ln A,
By definition, M and t can only be positive since a country cannot have 
a negative number of missiles or warheads per missile Thus, if a solution for 
t exists, it must exist within the range 0 ^ M < oo and the solution must be 
greater than 1 By taking the limit of t as M -* 0 and as M ©o, the existence 
of a relevant solution becomes immediately evident
Taking the limit of t as M -► 0,
, , , Mina . MlnMlimt = lim----------lim---------
M-.0 M-.0 in A, m-*> In A,
, t n , M lnM
lim t = 0 - h m ----------
M-o mho In A,
(22)
The product of M InM as M -> 0 has the indeterminate form of 0 
To solve equation (22), L Hôpital s Rule needs to be applied Rewriting 
equation (22) to an algebraic form that is compatible with L Hôpital s Rule,
hmt = -MHO
1
In A,
lim G(M)
mho H(M) 7—Thm ln A. mho
InM (2 3 )
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Applying L Hôpital s Rule to equation (23),
, . 1 , G (M )limt = ------lim—— —
m-»o ln  X M-*o H  (M )
-lim 'XM
in X, M-rt _  y
M
lim t = —^ rlim M  = 0 
M-*0 In A M-*0
(24)
Taking the limit of t as M °o also requires the use of L Hôpital s rule 
Rewriting equation (21) to an algebraic form that is compatible with 
L Hôpital s Rule,
, . 1 , cmlimt = -----lim
M-t- ln X
•lim
In a - ln M
Vmln X M-*~ /
Applying L Hôpital s Rule to equation (25),
G (M)
lim t = lim-
m-*~ ln X m-*- H (M)
1 . ~Vm----- lim — —
In X m-»~ _y .
M
lim t = -—rlim M =  °o 
m-*“ In A m-»“
(25)
(26)
From equations (24) and (26), it is clear a solution exists since t is 
defined for all positive M
From equation (21), it is clear the solution is unique since the variable t 
can be isolated However, it is not clear whether there is more than one 
value of M that yields the same value for t That is, it is not certain whether 
M versus t has a unique functional relationship This requires another proof
Suppose a, N, and X are constants over a specific time interval and t is 
the independent variable Then equation (20) could be rewritten as
M  = a
where
Ç1/M (27)
C=(X)‘
To solve for M, an iterative algorithm is needed 37 To use such an 
algorithm, consider the function F(M)
F<M> = M - ^  (28)
The root or roots of this function represent the solution(s) of equation 
(27) Takmg the range of M into consideration, the limit of F(M) as M -* 0
and as M  -> oo should confirm the existence of a solution for equation (27) 
limF(M) = -  oo (29)M-*0
limF(M) = ©oM-*» (30)
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F(M) —» -  <*> as M —» 0 because Ç —> O as M —> 0 Since Ç is a survival 
probability parameter, Ç < 1 and approaches 0 as 1/M -» oo f (M) oo as M -> 
oo because the M term dominates the expression
Since F(M) is a continuous function over the range 0 < M < «>, 
equations (29) and (30) show that F(M) = 0 for some positive value(s) of M 
Thus, a solution for equation (27) exists
To determine the uniqueness of the solution, consider equation (28) in 
the following form
lnF(M ) = l n|M- — (31)
Differentiating equation (31) with respect to M,
L ÌM I___ (32)
F(M) F(M)\ \ M l  ^  I {  }
Simplifying,
F (M) = 1 + 77a C-*1 +M)/M (33)M
Considering all of the variables in equation (33) are positive, equation 
(33) reveals that F (M) is positive for all positive M This shows that F(M) 
does not contain local maxima or minima Combining this mathematical 
characteristic with equations (29) and (30), it is clear F(M) can only intersect 
the M-axis once Thus, there is only one root for F(M) It logically follows 
that there is only one solution for equation (27) that is relevant to ICBM 
dynamics
The Graphic Utility of Saaty s Model
The derived solutions for Saaty s equations are unique It follows that 
Saaty s two-dimensional plot of the region of stability represents the entire 
solution set Figure 3 is a reproduction of Saaty s plot The values of the 
constants were selected to show clearly the characteristics of the curve The 
values do not represent any real ICBM dynamics
Like the I-B model, ICBM dynamics between Country A and Country B 
can be represented by movements on a weapons plane such as the one shown 
m Figure 3 39 If the plot is three-dimensional, the dynamics can be shown in a 
weapons space
However, in Saaty s plot, there is no region of initiation Saaty s model 
does not specify the conditions for war initiation His equations only specify 
the conditions for nuclear stability In other words, Saaty bases his model on 
conditions where each side will definitely not go to war Should those
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conditions not be met, a new set of conditions, such as an offensive success 
criterion, would have to be established to determine whether a country will 
initiate a war or anticipate an attack by the adversary
Figure 3 Saaty's Region of Stability38
With all other variables constant except M and N, the intersection of 
the two curves m Figure 3 represents the optimal force structure for both 
countries At this point, each side achieves its respective security goals while 
minimizing the number of missiles required to achieve those goals It can be 
considered the Point of Mutual Optimization (PMO) With respect to ICBM 
arms control objectives, the PMO is the mutual objective point
With the introduction of MIRVs in the early 1970s, ICBM dynamics 
became more complicated No longer could t be considered a constant over 
an infinite time interval Indeed, after the SALT I agreement, the value of t 
has been an integral part of strategic arms control negotiations In SALT II, 
the limits on t for the various weapons systems were just as significant as the 
launcher limits (M and N)
The transformation of t from a constant to a variable implies that a 
three-dimensional plot of M, N, and t may be a useful representation of ICBM 
dynamics To illustrate this, Figure 4 shows a three-dimensional plot of 
equation (16) in the M=N, t plane using the constants specified in Figure 3 
Table 1 shows the values of M and N for integer values of t
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Table 1 Discrete Values of PMOS for 1 ^ t ^  8
t M N
1 73 5 73 5
2 1103 1103
3 156 7 156 7
4 214 6 214 6
5 286 4 286 4
6 374 9 374 9
7 483 4 483 4
8 615 6 615 6
Figure 4 Locus of Points of Mutual Optimization
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Only the locus of PMOs was plotted within the range 1 < t < 8 Such a 
plot is particularly useful since it can clearly display the arms control objective 
curve and the current strategic pomt representing the ICBM status of both 
sides at time T0 The strategic point is the point (Mo,N0,t0) at time T0 where T0 
is a specified initial value such as January 1,1991
Note that the globally optimal PMO is located at point (Mt=i,Nt=i,l)
The locus of PMOs for t < 1 is not defined since a nation cannot have less 
than one warhead per missile However, a nation can have an average 
number of warheads per missile that is not an integer value as long as t > 1 
Such a value approximates the effect of diversifying the distribution of 
warheads to each target
Since the locus of PMOs represents the solution for both equations (16) 
and (17), there is only one curve However, this implicitly assumes symmetry 
in Country A s and Country B s value systems and decision-makmg 
processes In actuality, there are numerous differences m each country s 
perception of their own and their adversary s military capabilities and 
strategies 40
To graphically express this difference, there should actually be two 
curves on the M-N-t plot—one representing the US perception of the state of 
the ICBM race and the other representing the Soviet perception There 
should also be two strategic points for the same reason Figure 5 shows two 
perceptually distinct plots of the locus of PMOs in the plane containing the t- 
axis and the line M=N where u=v= 68
Figure 5 Locus of PMOs as Perceived by Each Country
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From the plots shown in Figures 4 and 5, one goal of arms control can 
be considered the synthesis of the two loci into one function representing 
both countries, and of the two strategic points into one mutually agreeable 
point The former combination is primarily a political issue (what force 
configuration is mutually optimal and acceptable) and the latter combination 
is primarily an empirical one (what forces currently exist)
If the graphic plots were applied to modeling arms control 
negotiations, paths would have to be defined from the mutually agreed 
strategic point to a point on the PMOs curve The path would represent the 
controlled ICBM dynamics during the implementation of the agreement (See 
Figure 6) Ideally, the path would ultimately end at pomt (Mt=i,Nt=i,l)
Figure 6 ICBM Dynamics m Weapons Space
If ti and t2 are added to the model, one of the two variables has to be 
graphed implicitly on the PMOs curve This can be done in a manner similar 
to the plotting of the Moody diagram representing fluid dynamics through a 
pipe 41 This way, an entire family of curves can be plotted for different values 
of the implicit variable
23
The implicit variable can be graphed by equating equations (16) and (17) 
and solving for the implicit t variable with respect to the explicit t variable 
For example, if t2 was the implicit variable, the following equation would 
have to be solved with respect to ti
- = ------- Ê-------  (34)M =N  =■ a
1 -
(tí
1/3 1 —
(tí
1/3
Since a  and ß are constants, a new constant can be defined that contains 
a  and ß
t2 _ / „
( t í w I (tí
(35)
where
r  - a  
Cl"ß
Taking the natural logarithm of equation (35),
t2ln l -
(ti
1/31 — sy+
\ (tí i
Simplifying
t?=
ln|l
K
(tí
lnCi (36)
(37)
l/3l
where
K =t]ln|l---- i U  + lnC,
\ (tí /
Using equation (37), the values of t2 can be calculated for inputs of ti 
and marked along the locus 42
Given the various graphical methods of utilizing Saaty s model, the 
next step is to examine the utility of Saaty s model in the US-Soviet ICBM 
context Based on this examination, the model can be adapted accordingly
Saaty s Model and US-Soviet ICBM Dynamics ,
With respect to contemporary issues, Saaty s model structure could be most 
useful as a tool for analyzing the strategic impact of ICBM modernization and 
future START reductions 43 In addition, it could be used as an aid to
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formulating US arms control proposals that are consistent with defined 
political and military objectives for US ICBMs
The model could also be used as an aid to analyzing Soviet arms 
control proposals Numerical comparisons with previous Soviet proposals 
could be made With this type of information, one could systematically assess 
the productivity of the negotiations with respect to ICBM security objectives
In order for it to be used for these purposes, Saaty s model requires 
input information and structural adaptation First, to obtain useable results, 
political and empirical inputs are needed The constants in Saaty s equations 
need to be defined and the corresponding values need to be assigned As 
noted earlier, the four constants are a, ß, u and v 44 Recall that a and ß are 
obtained from the political process Approximations of u and v can be 
obtained by using empirical data of ICBM technical capabilities
By using equations derived by Tsipis, u and v can be expressed as a 
function of the empirical variables Tsipis s equations are more realistic, 
since current silo hardness levels, missile reliability, and nuclear testing 
calculations are taken into account45
One factor that is not considered however is the bias Bias is the 
systematic error m accuracy experienced by the attacking warhead The 
magnitude of this error is dependent on the warhead trajectory, the location 
of the launch point, and the position of the impact point This factor cannot 
be quantified since the experiments yielding such data have (fortunately) not 
been conducted Following conventional assumptions, the bias will be 
neglected 46
For technically identical warheads originating from different 
launchers, Tsipis derives the following equation describing the survival 
probability 47
where
ps(p n) = [ i - p p jn 
-Y*y
Pk= 1 -  e '22H MCEP)2
(38)
Ps(rn) -  Survival probability function
Pk -  Kill probability function with perfect
missile reliability
r -  Missile reliability
n -  Number of warheads directed at the target
Y -  Warhead yield
H -  Hardness of target
Œ P -  Cirde of Equal Probability
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Like Saaty s model, Tsipis equation also assumes implicitly that blast is 
the most effective method of energy transfer that can ensure the destruction 
of hardened targets
From equations (12), (13), and (38), it is clear that zm = Ps(r,n) Based on 
this relation,
u = rPk (39)
The effect of the (t)-1/3 term is represented on the right-hand side of the 
equation by the warhead yield, Y
In addition to the required inputs, Saaty s model structure needs to be 
modified to account for the different ICBM systems possessed by each side 
The present model structure assumes each side possesses a homogeneous 
force Saaty s model can be adapted to US-Soviet ICBM dynamics in two 
ways
First, the ICBM arsenals can be divided into smaller sets where each set 
consists of only one type of ICBM type Each US set can be paired off with a 
Soviet set (See Figure 7) By defining the values of a and b for each set, Saaty s 
model could then be applied to each US-Soviet pair Two solutions would be 
obtained representing the US and Soviet perspective on the strategy used by 
the adversary to inflict a first strike
The division of the arsenals into smaller groups can be considered a 
representation of each missile field and the limited range of the missiles If 
more than one set can be used agamst an adversary s set, a utility function 
modeling the nuclear strategies of each side would have to be specified m 
order to determine how each side would match the sets
Second, Saaty s model can be further modified to account for the use of 
technically diverse warheads directed at the same target Unlike the previous 
adaptation, this situation requires changes m the fundamental equation 
Without loss of generality, consider equation (16) with a synergistic factor to 
account for multiple targeting of the same site with different warhead types 
M = ----------S----------- = --------- « ____  (40)
w
n«-k,) tjNj/M
X ( l - k 1) ,,N,/M
1 = 1
where
X -  Synergistic factor
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" -  Hypothetical U S Perception of Soviet Attack
_________ -  Hypothetical Soviet Perception of U S Attack
Figure 7 US-Soviet Pairing of ICBM Sets
The synergistic factor is a term that permits the model to break up the 
problem into a series of steps This way, the model can account for each 
warhead type individually and then statistically combine the effect For 
example, if the Soviets directed one SS-18 warhead, one SS-17 warhead, and 
two SS-19 warheads against an MX silo so that each would reach the target 
silo at about the same time, the model would simulate the attack as the 
Soviets launching three separate attacks using a different ICBM type The 
dynamics are not identical, but the outcome is the same Figure 8 illustrates 
how X is used in this simulation
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Figure 8 Saaty's Model Adapted for Realistic Application
Note that Saaty s adapted model shown m Figure 8 does not include a 
model of either side s wartime strategy The algorithm requires this data as 
an input Linked to a missile war model, Saaty s model of a hypothetical 
situation can make the transition to simulating real dynamics
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Conclusions and Recommendations
When Saaty presented his model, he made "no claim for applicability" 
and thus only scratched the surface of his model s mathematical and 
graphical utility 48 Through further investigation, Saaty s model has proven 
to be a useful methodology for quantitative analysis of ICBM dynamics With 
respect to the missile and MIRV variables, the model generates unique 
solutions and is compatible with graphical representations of the dynamics 
Furthermore, the model s structure can be readily adapted to simulate both 
hypothetical and real two-nation ICBM dynamics
To further examine the model s utility, the appropriate mathematical 
proofs should be done to determine whether the model can be used to 
analyze policy-induced changes that affect variables other than M, N, or t In 
addition, the model should move beyond the realm of description into 
optimization By linking it to objective functions containing strategic or 
economic parameters, its utility as an integral component to optimization 
problems can be examined
When introducing a new tool, it is important not to sell it as the 
panacea to all of the world s problems Like all tools, Saaty s model has 
limitations which need to be recognized explicitly when using the model
Saaty s model can provide insight on current ICBM issues, although it 
cannot provide answers From a technical side, its accuracy cannot be 
determined because nobody knows exactly what deters and what are the 
effects of a nuclear war Nuclear effects such as fratricide, and missile 
dynamics such as bias are unknowns and will hopefully remain that way
The model cannot provide answers for nontechnical reasons as well 
There are so many aspects of the human condition that cannot be quantified 
yet are important to this area of study Factors such as the psychology of 
decision-makers and the morality of nuclear strategy have to be taken into 
account, but cannot be adequately represented in models
Like all products, mathematical models should only be used after 
reading the warmng label As long as the inherent limitations of 
mathematical modeling are placed in proper perspective, the advantageous 
aspects of quantitative analysis can be used effectively and responsibly
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